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ABSTRACT This paper presents a study on physical layer authentication problem for in vivo nano networks
at terahertz (THz) frequencies. A system model based on envisioned nano network for in vivo body-centric
nano communication is considered and distance-dependent pathloss based authentication is performed.
Experimental data collected from THz time-domain spectroscopy setup shows that pathloss can indeed be
used as a device fingerprint. Furthermore, simulation results clearly show that given a maximum tolerable
false alarm rate, detection rate up to any desired level can be achieved within the feasible region of the
proposed method. It is anticipated that this paper will pave a new paradigm for secured, authenticated nano
network for future applications, e.g., drug delivery and Internet of nano-things-based intelligent office.
INDEX TERMS Physical layer security, authentication, terahertz band, intrusion detection, body sensor
networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of novel nano-materials (e.g., graphene-
based carbon nano tubes etc.) with remarkable properties,
interest in development of nano devices, their inter-
connectivity to realize the internet of nano things [1]–[4],
and its applicability in biomedical applications [5] is increas-
ing rapidly. When compared with the traditional methods,
e.g., endoscopy [6], the wireless-capable nano-scale devices
are less obtrusive and non-invasive in nature which makes
them an ideal candidate for the in-vivo biomedical applica-
tions [5], [7]. Terahertz (THz) band (0.1–10 THz) is con-
sidered as the most promising band for operation of nano
devices [5], because of its non-ionization and robustness to
the fading characteristics.
As of today, there are very limited studies in open literature
which discuss nano-scale communication in THz band and
its applicability in the biomedical domain [1], [5], [8]–[15].
Specifically, the literature so far comprises of the stud-
ies which investigate the antenna design [9], propagation
models [10], transceiver design [11], [16], networking issues
[12], [17], and data rates [18]. Though there have been studies
which discuss physical layer authentication in macro-macro
interface (see, e.g., [19] and references therein) and micro-
micro interface (see, e.g., [20] and references therein); to
the best of authors’ knowledge, no studies have been per-
formed so far to discuss the security and authentication issues
related to nano-scale communication at THz frequencies.
In this paper, an initial study has been performed where
authentication is done based upon a pathloss model (empir-
ically deduced by co-authors of this paper in their previous
work [10]).
The main contributions of this work are the following:
i) the proposal of exploiting distance-dependent pathloss
as transmitter fingerprint for physical layer authentication
at a nano receiver node, ii) experimental verification of i)
via THz time-domain spectroscopy setup at QMUL, UK,
iii) the algorithmic solution for the proposed authentication
method, iv) investigation of performance of proposed method
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(i.e., detection performance, feasible and non-feasible
regions).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section-II introduces the system model. Section-III outlines
the details of the proposed authentication method, while
Section-IV investigates its performance via two different
performance metrics. Numerical results are presented in
Section-V. Finally, concluding remarks are drawn in
Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The envisioned architecture for nano-network based in-vivo
healthcare is given in [5], and is shown in Fig. 1.
FIGURE 1. Envisioned architecture for nano-healthcare [5].
The main components of the envisioned architecture
include:
• Nano-nodes: simplest devices composed of sensor and
communication units, which can transmit to short dis-
tance the output of a simple computation.
• Nano-routers: can collect data from a multitude of nano
nodes and are capable to send a limited number of
commands.
• Nano-micro interface: are hybrid devices able to com-
municate at both nano and micro/macro paradigm.
• Gateway: or Access point (AP) makes system to work
remotely over the Internet.
Based on the architecture given in Fig. 1, a system
model is established to study the authentication problem in
nano-networks. Fig. 2 shows the system model used in this
study. The model consists of three nano nodes: Alice, Bob
and Eve. Alice is the legitimate transmit node, envisioned as
an on-body nano-node which sends some control command
every once in a while to a legitimate receive node Bob,
envisioned as a nano-node present inside the human body.
Under the envisioned nano-healthcare scenario, one potential
task of the Bob node could be targeted drug delivery. To this
end, Bob will perform certain sensing (e.g., measuring cell
temperature, blood suger level etc.) periodically, and report
it to the on-body nano-node Alice. Then, whenever Bob
receives a control command from Alice, it performs targeted
drug delivery (by injecting prescribed amount of drug into the
target cells).
FIGURE 2. Authentication in a nano-scale body-centric communication
network.
Having motivated a potential nano-healthcare scenario,
imagine now a situation, where an intruder node Eve
attempts to break into the system by pretending to be
Alice and sending a malicious control command to Bob.
Such intrusion/impersonation attack, if not thwarted prop-
erly, could lead to severe (life threatening) consequences.
Therefore, the Bob node must authenticate each and every
data packet/control command it receives, in a systematic
manner.
III. THE PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION METHOD
This work studies the feature-based authentication problem
in nano healthcare networks. Specifically, this work proposes
to exploit distance-dependent pathloss as device fingerprint
to discriminate the data sent by Alice from that of intruder
Eve. At this point, it is worth mentioning that the authentica-
tion problem at hand is in principle very similar to the clas-
sical problems of detection and classification. Nevertheless,
the only important distinction is that in case of authentication
problem, the device fingerprint of Eve is unknown. This
limitation renders the classical methods (e.g., likelihood ratio
test etc.) not applicable to authentication problem. Bayesian
methods are also not applicable for the exact same reason.
Therefore, Neyman-Pearson based binary hypothesis testing
is typically implemented to carry out the authentication task
at Bob.
In operational terms, the proposed authentication method
consists of two distinct phases, training phase and authen-
tication phase. During the training phase, Bob learns the
pathloss of Alice’s transmission PLAB (a.k.a the ground
truth) via training with Alice on a secure channel.1 Then
later, during the authentication phase, Eve could transmit as
well. Therefore, Bob’s task is then to authenticate each and
every packet it receives on the shared channel. Bob does the
authentication by performing binary hypothesis testing on
the pathloss measurement extracted from currently received
packet. This way, Bob systematically accepts (rejects) the
data from Alice (Eve).
1This assumption is inline with the previous literature (see,
e.g., [19], [20]).
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This work assumes that all the three nodes (Alice, Bob and
Eve) of the considered system model as well as the composi-
tion of the fluid medium in between remain stationary. A con-
sequence of this assumption is that the ground truth (PLAB)
becomes a relatively static quantity. This in turn implies
that, for the proposed method, the ratio of training phase
duration to authentication phase duration (i.e., the training
overhead) is very small. However, when either Alice or Bob
is mobile (e.g., floating inside blood), or, the composition
of the fluid channel between Alice and Bob is dynamic,
the ground truth becomes time-varying. In this case, one
simple yet elegant approach is that Bob should acquire the
ground truthmore often. This in turn signifies that the training
overhead becomes proportional to the mobility rate of the
legitimate nano nodes (Alice and/or Bob). A more sophisti-
cated approach will be to model the mobility of each of the
three nano nodes via some appropriate dynamicalmodel (e.g.,
Brownian motion/Random walk is a well-known and well-
acclaimed model to emulate the movement of gas molecules
trapped in a box etc.). Nevertheless, we note that the mobility
of nano-nodes (and/or the case of dynamic fluid environment)
is out of scope of this work.
Before we outline the more fine-grained details of the
proposed method, in the next subsection, we first present
the rationale behind using pathloss as device fingerprint for
discrimination between the transmit nodes (Alice and Eve) as
well as the experimental validation of the rationale.
A. PATHLOSS AS DEVICE FINGERPRINT: RATIONALE &
EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
For a point-to-point, on-body/inside-skin, THz Communica-
tion system, an (experimentally deduced and thus) accurate
pathloss model was recently presented (by the co-authors of
this paper) in [10]:
PL(d, f ,N ) = −0.2 ∗ N+3.98+(0.44 ∗ N+98.48)d (0.65)
+ (0.068 ∗ N + 2.4)f (4.07) (1)
where d is the distance (in mm) between transmit node and
receive node, f is the center frequency (in THz), and N is
number of sweat ducts. Let’s denote by dAB (dEB) the distance
between Alice (Eve) and Bob. Eq. (1) then suggests that
pathloss, being distance-dependent, can indeed be used as
device fingerprint provided that |dAB − dEB| ≥ η where η
is a threshold.
Fig. 3 shows the pathloss measurements as a function of
frequency (obtained from the THz-TDS setup at QMUL, UK)
for two skin samples with different thickness values. Fig. 3
corroborates the pathloss model of Eq. (1) and attests to the
fact that the pathloss is indeed distance (thickness) dependent.
B. BINARY HYPOTHESIS TESTING
At time tm, when Bob receives a packet from the shared chan-
nel, it makes a noisy measurement z(m) of the pathloss (this
could be done, e.g., using the pulse-based method discussed
in [21]). With z(m) in hand, Bob constructs the following
FIGURE 3. Pathloss as Device Fingerprint: Experimental Validation.
Pathloss measurements were obtained via THz-TDS setup at QMUL, UK.
More details about the THz-TDS setup can be found in [10].
binary hypothesis testing problem:{
H0 : z(m) = PLAB(dAB)+ (m)
H1 : z(m) = PLEB(dEB)+ (m) (2)
where PLAB(dAB) (PLEB(dEB)) is the distance-dependent
pathloss of the channel between Alice (Eve) and Bob, and
follows Eq. (1). Moreover, (m) is the estimation error
assumed to be zero-mean Gaussian with variance σ 2(m).
Typically, σ 2(m) = c.σ 2BK (m).PTx (m) where σ 2B is the variance
of white Gaussian noise at Bob, K (m) is the length of the
preamble preceding the data, PTx(m) is the transmit power of
the sender node2 and c is a constant.
Dropping the time index m for simplicity, it is straight-
forward to see that z|H0 ∼ N (PLAB, σ 2) while z|H1 ∼
N (PLEB, σ 2). IfH0 = 1, received packet is accepted by Bob;
if H1 = 1, received packet is rejected by Bob.
Next, since the ground truth PLAB is known with sufficient
accuracy (via prior training in the beginning, on a secure
channel), Bob applies the following test:
T = |z− PLAB|
H1
≷
H0
δ (3)
where δ is the comparison threshold (a design parameter)
whose value is to be determined.
C. ALGORITHMIC IMPLEMENTATION
The only thing further required to implement the hypoth-
esis test of Eq. (3) is the value of threshold δ. In this
work, we utilized Neyman-Pearson method which systemat-
ically computes the value of δ once provided with a max-
imum tolerable value of the probability of false alarm Pfa
(i.e., incorrectly identifying Alice’s packet as if it is from
Eve).
2PTx ,K are the system parameters, pre-known to (and fixed for) all the
nodes in the network; therefore, they remain the same no matter who among
Alice or Eve transmits on the shared channel.
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Let y = z − PLAB. Then, y|H0 ∼ N (0, σ 2) and y|H1 ∼
N (PLEB − PLAB, σ 2). Then, Pfa is given as:
Pfa = Pr(|y| > δ|H0)
= 2Q
(
δ
σ
)
(4)
where Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x e
− t22 dt is the complementary cumu-
lative distribution function (CCDF) of standard normal dis-
tribution.
By setting Pfa to the pre-specified value, δ can be calcu-
lated using Eq. (4) as:
δ = σQ−1
(
Pfa
2
)
(5)
At this point, it is worth mentioning that the computation
of δ in Eq. (5) requires only the knowledge of variance
σ 2 (of the pathloss measurement error ) which could be
easily computed offline (i.e., before the authentication phase
commences). Moreover, one can infer from Eq. (5) that the
hypothesis of Eq. (3) remains effective as long as Eve doesn’t
adapt its transmit power which is indeed assumed in this
work.
The proposed authentication method is summarized in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The Proposed Authentication Method
Phase-I: Training (H0 = 1)
Bob learns the ground truth (i.e.,PLAB) on a secure channel
Phase-II: Authentication
while (1) do
Bob computes the threshold δ from Eq. (5)
Bob implements the binary hypothesis test in Eq. (3) to
systematically accept/reject data packets
end while
IV. PERFORMANCE OF THE PROPOSED METHOD
A. DETECTION RATE
While carrying out hypothesis testing, Bob could make two
kind of errors: i) Bob discards the data of Alice thinking
that it came from Eve, the so-called probability of false
alarm Pfa, ii) Bob accepts the data coming from Eve thinking
that it came from Alice, the so-called probability of missed
detection Pmd .
In this work, we have employed Neyman-Pearson
method which guarantees to minimize (maximize)
Pmd (Pd = 1−Pmd ), for a fixed/given value ofPfa. Therefore,
we proceed to compute the probability of missed detection
Pmd (success probability of Eve) which is as follows:
Pmd = Pr(|y| < δ|H1) (6)
Assuming that unknown pathloss PLEB is uniformly dis-
tributed within a reasonable range PLEB ∼ U(1min,1max),
we have the following expression:
Pmd = 1
1max −1min
∫ 1max
1min
[
Q
(−δ − PLEB + PLAB
σ
)
−Q
(
δ − PLEB + PLAB
σ
)]
dPLEB (7)
A closed-form solution of Eq. (7) cannot be obtained
because it involves the integration of the Q-function.
It is worth mentioning that Eq. (7) is typically solved
offline (before the authentication phase commences) to obtain
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. The only
information missing to solve Eq. (7) are the limits of inte-
gration, i.e., 1min and 1max , which one can compute in a
relatively straightforward manner provided that Bob knows
the fixed transmit power PTx used by the transmit nodes
(Alice and Eve) which is indeed assumed in this
work.
B. DEFLECTION COEFFICIENT
Another important performance metric of interest in Detec-
tion theory is Deflection coefficient, which quantifies the
separation between two conditional probability densities of
the test statistic under consideration. Larger the value of
the deflection coefficient, better is the detection perfor-
mance and vice versa. Specifically, the deflection coeffi-
cient for any binary hypothesis testing scheme is defined
as:
ξ = (E[T |H1]− E[T |H0])
2
Var(T |H0) (8)
where T is the test statistic of interest (defined in Eq. (3) for
our proposed method). Then, one can verify that T in Eq. (3)
has a folded normal distribution; therefore, E[T |H0] =
σ.
√
2/pi and:
E[T |H1] = σ.
√
2/pi. exp (
−(PLEB − PLAB)2
2σ 2
)
− (PLEB − PLAB).(1− 28(−(PLEB−PLAB)/σ ))
(9)
where 8 (x) = 1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞ e
− t22 dt is the cumulative distribu-
tion function (CDF) of standard normal distribution. Finally,
Var(T |H0) = σ 2(1− 2/pi ).
C. FEASIBLE AND NON-FEASIBLE REGIONS
As is suggested by Fig. 3, pathloss, being distance-dependent,
can indeed be used as device fingerprint provided that |dAB−
dEB| ≥ η where η is a threshold. This in turn implies that
|dAB−dEB| ≥ η corresponds to the feasible region (where the
proposed authentication method meets the pre-specified per-
formance requirements), while |dAB − dEB| < η corresponds
to the non-feasible region (where the proposed authentication
method breaks down).
Eqs. (8), (9) together reveal that ξ is solely a function of
the two fingerprints PLAB and PLEB which in turn means ξ is
a function of two distances, i.e., the distance between Alice
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FIGURE 4. The feasible and non-feasible regions for the proposed
method: In this 2D map/layout, Bob is placed at origin, while Alice is
located at a distance dAB from origin. Then if the Eve lies anywhere
within the grey region, i.e., |dAB − dEB| < η, then ξ < β, and thus, α-level
detection using proposed method is not feasible. However, when Eve is is
anywhere in blue region, i.e., |dAB − dEB| ≥ η, then ξ ≥ β, and thus,
α-level detection using proposed method is feasible. (dEB− = dAB − η;
dEB+ = dAB + η.)
and Bob dAB, and the distance between Eve and Bob dEB
(see Eq. (1)). Similarly, from Eq. (7), one could deduce the
same, i.e., Pmd is solely a function of the two fingerprints
PLAB and PLEB (and hence a function of two distances dAB
and dEB). Fig. 4 then graphically illustrates that Deflection
coefficient ξ and detection rate Pd together could be utilized
to identify the feasible and non-feasible regions for our pro-
posed authentication scheme. Specifically, for a desired/pre-
specified minimum detection performance α (i.e., Pd ≥ α),
the following relations hold:
Pd ≥ α ⇔ ξ ≥ β ⇔ |dAB − dEB| ≥ η
(feasible region) (10)
|dAB − dEB| < η⇔ ξ < β ⇔ Pd < α
(non-feasible region) (11)
(where β and η are the thresholds).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Owing to the fact that there aren’t any nano-devices man-
ufactured to date which could be leveraged to investigate
the performance of the proposed authentication method in a
real-time setting, this section provides extensive simulation
results.
Fig. 5 provides a quantitative example to illustrate that
Deflection coefficient ξ and detection rate Pd could indeed
help us identify the feasible and non-feasible regions
for our proposed authentication scheme (as discussed in
Section IV-C earlier). Specifically, Fig. 5 states that the rela-
tions (10),(11) indeed hold with α = 0.98, β = 166.7,
η = 2 mm. In other words, Fig. 5 reveals that the
FIGURE 5. The feasible and non-feasible regions for the proposed
method: In this simulation, dAB = 15 mm, while dEB is varied. It shows
that when Eve lies anywhere within the grey region of Fig. 4, i.e., when
|dAB − dEB| < η = 2 mm, then ξ < β = 166.7, and thus, (α = 0.98)-level
detection using proposed method is not feasible. However, when Eve lies
anywhere in blue region of Fig. 4, i.e., |dAB − dEB| ≥ η, then ξ ≥ β, and
thus, α-level detection using proposed method is feasible. (Other system
parameters were set to the following values: N = 4, f = 1.2 THz,
Pfa = 10−6, σ = 7.07 mm.)
proposed authentication algorithm successfully detects the
intrusions (i.e., Eve’s transmissions) > 98% of times pro-
vided that Eve’s distance to Bob dEB is off by at least 2 mm
from Alice’s distance to Bob dAB.
Fig. 6 plots the receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curves for various values of |dAB − dEB| (or, equiva-
lently Deflection coefficient ξ ). Specifically, the locations
of Alice and Bob are fixed such that dAB = 15 mm,
while Eve is placed at five different locations such that
dEB ∈ [13, 14, 15, 16, 17] mm. The black ROC curve rep-
resenting the case ξ = 0 coincides with the 450 line which
implies that the proposed method ceases to be effective when
dAB = dEB. In such situation, flipping a coin to observe its
output for decision making performs equally well as the pro-
posed scheme. Fig. 6 also confirms the hypothesis that greater
the ξ is, so is Pd 3 (for a given Pfa). Finally, the zoomed-
in plot representing the case ξ = 166.71 (within Fig. 6)
shows the typical trade-off between Pd and Pfa; i.e., it
is not possible to increase Pd without sacrificing Pfa and
vice versa.
Fig. 7 provides the graphical illustration of the working
of Hypothesis test of Eq. (3) for 100 uses of the shared
channel (we assume P(H0) = P(H1) = 0.5, i.e., we assume
that at any given time-slot, Alice and Eve are equally likely
to transmit). Since the hypothesis test of Eq. (3) essentially
computes the absolute deviation of each (pathloss) measure-
ment z from the ground truth PLAB and compares it with a
pre-set threshold δ to make a decision, Fig. 7 provides us a
way to visually spot and segregate the transmissions from
the intruder node Eve (the transmissions with large magni-
tude/value of the test statistic T ), and the transmissions from
3In other words, greater disparity between dAB and dEB helps authentica-
tion cause, as explained in Fig. 4.
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FIGURE 6. ROC curves for the proposed scheme: dAB = 15 mm,
dEB ∈ [13,17] mm, σ = 7.07 mm, N = 4, f = 1.2 THz.
FIGURE 7. Hypothesis test of Eq. (3) in action (Pfa = 10−3, N = 4,
f = 1.2 THz, σ = 7.07 mm, dAB = 15 mm, dEB = 13 mm).
the legitimate sender Alice (the transmissions with smaller
magnitude/value of the test statistic T ).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a physical layer authentication scheme based
on distance-dependent pathloss is studied for in-vivo nano
networks at terahertz frequencies. For the proposed authenti-
cation scheme, detection performance has been investigated,
and feasible and non-feasible regions are identified.
It is anticipated that this work will pave a way for designing
secured, authenticated links for the future nano-networks.
For example, this study has already pointed towards several
directions for future research, e.g., incorporating the mobility
of the nano nodes into the proposed authentication frame-
work, design of cross-layer authentication schemes, com-
bining multiple features for improved authentication perfor-
mance etc.
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